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The Brooklyn-Queens Expressway: Time is Running Out

O

by Ross Sandler*
ne year ago, in January 2020, the Expert
Panel assigned by Mayor Bill de Blasio to
study the Brooklyn-Queens Expressway
issued its Final Report. Mayor de Blasio
in April 2019 appointed the 17-person Expert Panel,
of which I was a member, following the angry rejection of New York City DOT’s plan for reconstructing
the section of the BQE adjacent to Brooklyn Heights,
Dumbo and Downtown Brooklyn. City DOT had earlier presented its plan in September 2018. The plan
caused immediate outrage.
The flashpoint for the opposition was the City’s
plan to turn the Brooklyn Heights Promenade into a
temporary highway for the BQE’s 150,000 vehicles a
day during the six or more years of construction. The
reconstruction is necessary because the BQE’s triple
cantilevered bridge, which supported the Promenade,
is at the end of its life and must be replaced. The City
planned to replace the cantilevered bridge with an
eight-lane, double-decked, elevated interstate highway supported by columns.
The BQE’s cantilevered bridge opened in 1954
and was built into the hillside that rises from Brooklyn’s waterfront to Brooklyn Heights above. The can-
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tilevered bridge runs along Furman Street for .4 miles
and is tightly bounded by Brooklyn Heights on the
landside and by Brooklyn Bridge Park and new apartment buildings on the waterside.
Engineers in 2016 following an in-depth inspection rated the cantilevered bridge as in “poor” or “fair”
condition. Water and salt infiltration had corroded
and weakened the steel embedded in the cantilevered
roadways. The engineers projected that the cantilevered bridge could become unsafe as early as 2026, a
stunningly short time given the length of time it takes
to design and construct a major highway.
The engineering report was a call for urgent action. Engineers know that failure to act can be deadly.
On August 14, 2018 the 54-year-old Morandi
Bridge in Genoa, Italy collapsed; 43 people died.
The cause: similar water and salt infiltration into the
concrete that encased the steel stays that supported
the roadway. The steel stays rusted, weakened and
snapped. Engineers had warned officials. The officials
failed to act, the repair work was never done, and the
bridge collapsed.
On March 23, 2020 Seattle, Washington closed
the West Seattle Bridge, Seattle’s busiest bridge


(continued on page 80)

TORTS

(CONTÕD)

walk in a reasonably safe condition, but the owner’s
duty did not extend to maintenance to City-owned
tree wells. Landowners may be liable for the injuries
from the tree well only when the landowner has created the dangerous condition or failed to fix/repair the
area when they knew it was damaged and could cause
someone to get hurt. In this case there was no evidence that the owner created a dangerous condition
in the tree well.
Powroznik v. City of N.Y., 117 NYS3d 850 (2nd Dep’t. 2020).
SCHOOL INJURY

School owed duty to child struck by car
Child released from after-school program struck by
vehicle near school grounds. A 13-year-old child was
struck and injured by a vehicle after being released
from an after-school program run by the Simpson
Street Development Association. The Association
is a not-for-profit community-based organization
operating under a contract with the City Department
of Youth and Community Development. Upon leaving
the school building at around 6:00 p.m., the child, his
brother, and four friends, played a game called “Man
Hunt”—a tag-like game, where participants chase
each other around to give bear hugs. To avoid being
hugged during the game, the child ran into a dimly lit
road and was struck by a car. The accident occurred
on Fox Street in the Bronx, where the Association
required students to exit the building.
The child’s father, Edwin Cruz, sued the
Association and the City of New York. Cruz alleged
that the Association and the City failed to adequately
supervise his child and negligently required students
to leave through an exit on Fox Street, as opposed
to a much safer alternative exit on Tiffany Street.
Tiffany Street has street signs, a lower speed limit,
and speed bumps. In their defense, the Association
and City argued that they were not negligent, that the
accident occurred after the child was released from
their custody, that the child was provided a safe exit
from the school, and that the child’s own actions were
the sole cause of the accident.
The lower court rejected the Association and
City’s arguments, and the Appellate Division, First
Department affirmed. The Appellate Division
concluded that a school’s liability extended to injuries
which occur close to school and shortly after school
hours, and that a school breaches its duty when it
releases a child into a foreseeably hazardous setting.
The Appellate Division denied summary judgment
because triable facts existed as to the safety of the
environment into which the child was released. Lastly,
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the Appellate Division agreed that the defendants’
motion was premature, as certain depositions and
other discovery evidence remained outstanding.
Cruz v. City of New York, 124 N.Y.S.3d 22 (1st Dep’t 2020).

COVER ARTICLE
BQE

(Cont’d from 69)

because of corrosion which could potentially cause
a collapse. City engineers found severe deterioration
in the steel girders supporting the structure. Cracks
in the concrete roadways were expanding daily.
The engineers declared the bridge unsafe forcing
Seattle to suddenly close the bridge. Seattle anticipates
that the bridge will be closed at least until 2022. The
West Seattle Bridge is 46 years old and carried 100,000
vehicles daily.
New York City has been warned but has yet to decide how to reconstruct the BQE. New York City, with
New York State, must decide on the reconstruction
plan. Failure to decide and begin construction will
lead to restrictions, closures, and the possibility of the
collapse of the BQE’s cantilevered bridge resulting in
injuries and deaths.
The BQE’s Cantilevered Bridge
The alignment of the BQE as it passes around
Brooklyn Heights was a miracle of engineering.
The nearly half mile of triple stacked cantilevered
roadways adjacent to Brooklyn Heights is a unique
bridge structure not duplicated anywhere else in the
United States.
Robert Moses in the 1950s hung the cantilevered
bridge of the BQE in a narrow corridor along the steep
slope rising from the Brooklyn waterfront to Brooklyn
Heights above. Moses had initially proposed that the
highway cut through the heart of Brooklyn Heights
along Hicks Street, an appalling plan that produced
opposition sufficient to cause Moses to move the
highway to the edge of Brooklyn Heights along Furman Street, an industrial waterfront at the time with
few residents.
Moses adopted a unique design: a cantilevered
structure. The cantilevered bridge is supported on the
land side with heavy concrete and steel walls sunk
into the slope. Hanging from this single land-side wall
are two three-lane roadways and the Brooklyn Promenade. The weight of the roadways and the Promenade are supported by steel buried in the concrete
roadways. The steel is in tension as it transfers the
downward force of its weight to the land-side wall. If
the steel in the roadways corrodes and weakens there
are no outside columns to support the roadways and
the roadways will fail. The roadways will no longer
Issue 4 • 2020

be able to support their own weight or the weight of
passing vehicles.
The key safety question, therefore, involves the
strength of the steel embedded in the roadways.
Current Corrosion
Steel reinforcing rods embedded in the concrete
roadways during the 1950s were not coated with
a protective covering. Salt and water infiltrate the
roadways of the cantilevered bridge through cracks
in the pavement, and at the joints which occur every
50 feet and run perpendicular to the direction of
traffic. Water and salt infiltration rust and weaken the
uncoated steel. Engineering studies of the concrete
pavement and the joints in 2016 found salt and water
infiltration at levels that were two to three times
higher than acceptable limits. At the level found,
corrosion is inevitable.
The corrosion is obvious to even a casual observer. Visible from below the cantilevered bridge are wire
mesh screens hanging beneath the joints of the deck.
City DOT installed the protective screens to keep concrete from falling as the joints corrode.
There is no cure for water and salt infiltration
that has already occurred. Patching the roadway
will not restore the lost strength and stiffness of the
cantilevered section of the BQE. If the structure falls
below margins of safety set by the State and federal
government, the City must close the BQE. It will have
no choice.
Reconstruction is the only long-term solution.
Reconstruct the Cantilevered Bridge. But How?
The narrowness of the right-of-way is the
primary difficulty in designing a replacement for
the cantilevered bridge. It was the right-of-way’s
narrowness that forced Robert Moses to build
the cantilevered bridge in the first place. With a
cantilevered structure, Moses was able stack the
roadways one on top of the other, rather than place
them side by side.
Today, in 2021, the right-of-way of the cantilevered bridge remains just as narrow, but conditions
for reconstruction of the highway are worse.
On the landside, Brooklyn Heights and its landmarked historic houses have grown even more revered
and untouchable. On the waterside, the piers and derelict structures have long ago been demolished and
replaced by the hugely popular Brooklyn Bridge Park
and several new upscale apartment houses, hotels and
restaurants. Robert Moses’s right-of-way, if anything,
has narrowed.
The constraints of this narrow corridor present a
dilemma. The BQE cannot be abandoned because it
is an essential link in the City’s interstate highway system. But, equally clear, the BQE’s cantilevered bridge
cannot be rebuilt and enlarged to meet today’s interIssue 4 • 2020

state highway standards because of the exceedingly
narrow right-of-way.
The City’s Plan
The City’s answer to the dilemma was to build
both a new eight-lane interstate highway within the
narrow corridor and to keep the detour for the 150,000
daily vehicles within the same narrow corridor.
The City would achieve this dual project by stacking the detour on top of the highway construction. The
City would first demolish the Promenade and build a
six-lane highway for the detour where the Promenade
had been. Once the 150,000 daily vehicles could be
moved to the Promenade, the City would demolish
in stages the two cantilevered roadways below and
build an eight-lane, double-decked, elevated interstate
highway on columns rising from Furman Street. The
vehicles would be moved down from the Promenade
detour once the interstate highway was complete. At
that point the Promenade would be rebuilt above the
interstate highway.
The finished elevated, double-decked, interstate
highway would be supported by columns set on either
side of Furman street. The new BQE would be closer
to Brooklyn Bridge Park and leave Furman Street tunnel-like and dark.
City DOT’s plan called for a major expansion of
the BQE to comply with federal standards for new interstate highways. The plan included travel lanes eighteen inches wider than the lanes on the cantilevered
bridge, longer exit and entrance approaches, and an
additional breakdown lane. These changes would add
about 15 feet to the width of a new elevated, doubledecked highway.
Construction of the detour and the interstate
highway would, the City projected, take six years, but
could take much longer. The plan itself was highly
innovative and risky. Unknowns included the
stability of the Brooklyn Heights slope and the risks
associated with the removal of the wall supporting
the cantilevered roadways. City DOT’s top engineer
on the project conceded that demolishing the
cantilevered bridge might uncover surprises and add
years. Further complicating construction was the
need to protect the four subway lines that run under
the cantilevered bridge: the 2 & 3, 4 & 5, A & C, and
R lines, and a subway tunnel fan house built directly
into the cantilevered bridge.
The Expert Panel’s Plan
Traffic primarily justified the City’s plan to build
an enlarged interstate highway. The City assumed
that the existing BQE traffic of 150,000 vehicles a-day
would grow by another 40,000 vehicles.
The Expert Panel rejected the City’s traffic justification for the enlarged highway. As the Panel observed, projections of increased traffic are almost alVolume 26
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ways overstated or, worse, self-fulfilling. Bigger roads
attract new vehicles. The opposite is also true. Reducing capacity lessens demand. This has been demonstrated in New York City with the 1973 closure of the
West Side Highway, recent closures of major Avenues
like parts of Broadway, the dedication of lanes to bicycles, the closure of the Central Park roadways, and
bus lanes on 14th Street.
The Panel concluded that the existing and future
traffic could be accommodated by a four-lane highway. The Panel wrote that the City
[S]hould redefine its program to a four-lane highway that will be capable of handling a traffic load adequate for the region, but with volumes slightly lower
than current usage. A four-lane configuration will be
possible as a result of traffic changes . . . . [and] will
be safer, reduce injuries, avoid capacity-reducing accidents and breakdowns, and will make the handling of
traffic during construction more manageable.

The Panel’s approach was novel. As urban interstate highways have aged, cities have mostly taken
one of three approaches: they have widened the highway (The Long Island Expressway), abandoned the
highway, or buried it (Boston’s Big Dig). The Expert
Panel rejected these options. Instead the Expert Panel
opted for a smaller, but more efficient and safer highway that would be made possible by managing traffic
on a regional basis.
If the BQE were reduced to four lanes and the
traffic stayed the same at 150,000 vehicles a day there
would be congestion during the peak morning and
evening rush hours. But if the traffic could be reduced
by between 400 and 500 cars during the peak hours, a
four-lane highway could carry the current traffic load.
The challenge was not the 150,000 vehicles scattered
over 24 hours, but the marginal number of vehicles
that put the roadway over capacity during the morning and evening rush hours.
Traffic Management
This realization led the Panel to recommend that
the City manage traffic as a system with the goal of
a reduction of the marginal additional travel on the
BQE. The Panel’s recommendation was timely because the State legislature in April 2019 had passed
congestion pricing for Manhattan traffic. Implementation of the congestion pricing plan has been delayed
by Covid-19 and a lack of federal approvals, but congestion pricing when implemented will provide relief
to the BQE.
The Panel proposed that the City adopt a series of
incremental traffic management changes that would
collectively reduce the traffic on the BQE to allow for
efficient functioning of a four-lane highway. These
changes include new pricing schedules and other
traffic management measures to be applied at the
Brooklyn Battery Tunnel, Manhattan Bridge, Brooklyn
82   CITYLAW Volume 26

Bridge, Williamsburg Bridge, Gowanus Expressway
and the Belt Parkway. Some of these strategies would
require legislation and cooperation with other entities
like the MTA and the Port Authority.
Potential traffic management efforts also include
changes to the exit and entrance ramps of the BQE
to enhance safety and efficiency, regulation of local
traffic and truck routes in downtown Brooklyn to
avoid local street congestion, encouragement of mass
transit use, and alternative freight options including
the use of ferries.
A four-lane highway would still meet safety requirements. Accidents are frequent on the cantilevered bridge due to narrow lanes and cramped and
tight entrances and exits. Minor accidents are a major
cause of the congestion now experienced on the cantilevered bridge. A well-designed four-lane highway
would have room for wider lanes, longer acceleration
lanes, safer entrances and exits, and a breakdown
lane. These changes would reduce the number of accidents and the resulting backups and congestion currently experienced on the cantilevered bridge.
Protect the Cantilevered Bridge
The cantilevered bridge will have to serve motorists until the City can begin construction. The City’s
engineers have projected that the cantilevered bridge
could become unsafe by 2026. The Expert Panel
wrote that the cantilevered bridge could become unsafe even sooner, by 2025. Steps will have to be taken
to preserve and protect the bridge. The Exert Panel
recommended two strategies: enforce current weight
restrictions and impose intensive monitoring on
the structure.
Overweight vehicles. Overweight trucks damage
structures. Older structures like the cantilevered
section of the BQE require strict enforcement of
weight limits.
The weight limit for trucks in New York City
(without special permits) is 80,000 pounds. The Expert Panel advised the City to embed experimental
technology in the roadways of the cantilevered structure that can weigh passing trucks. The City installed
the sensors and the resulting data were alarming. Between October 16, 2019 and January 19, 2020 eleven
percent of the trucks on the cantilevered section of
the BQE exceeded 80,000 pounds. Some of the trucks
weighed as much as 170,000 pounds!
The Expert Panel also employed another
formula to measure the impact of overweight trucks.
The Expert Panel evaluated truck weight data using
the federal bridge formula which relates truck
weight to the size of the truck and location of
the wheels of the truck. This formula permits a
more accurate analysis of the impact of the
overweight trucks on the bridge structure. Fully
27 percent of the trucks on the cantilevered section of
Issue 4 • 2020

the BQE exceeded the federal bridge standard.
The Expert Panel recommended that the City
immediately begin aggressive enforcement of weight
limits on the cantilevered section of the BQE.
Mayor Bill de Blasio responded by issuing an
executive order on January 31, 2020 establishing a
truck enforcement unit to enforce the weight limits on
the cantilevered section of the BQE. Violators could
be fined as much $7,000.
Mayor de Blasio’s executive order was a good
first step, but the execution required police officers to
stop vehicles and is very labor intensive. The Expert
Panel sought a more effective method of enforcement
and turned to the latest technology for enforcing
weight limitations.
The Expert Panel recommended that the new, experimental sensors be embedded permanently in the
roadways of the cantilevered bridge. These experimental sensors accurately weigh passing trucks. The sensors can be coordinated with cameras hanging above
the traffic. With accurate weight and identification
information the City could enforce weight restrictions
without stopping vehicles on the highway. Enforcement would be accomplished in the same manner as
red-light cameras currently identify red-light violators
on the City’s streets.
The City followed the Expert Panel’s recommendation and the experimental sensors were embedded
in the roadways of the cantilevered bridge of the BQE.
The sensors have proved sufficiently accurate to meet
evidentiary standards for enforcement. The City is
now seeking statutory authority from the State legislature to use the sensor and camera system to keep
overweight trucks from further damaging the BQE.
Hopefully the legislature will pass the legislation in
the 2021 session.
Intensive monitoring. Engineers design highways and bridges with substantial safety margins, but
over time the margin of safety shrinks. The City’s 2016
in-depth inspection found the cantilevered bridge in
a deteriorated condition and warned that there was
very little remaining margin of safety. To assure the
public that the cantilevered bridge remains safe, the
Expert Panel proposed that the City intensively monitor the bridge with sophisticated instrumentation.
These monitors included the following:
Strain Gauges: These gauges are installed at critical sectors and continuously track and report on
the strains and stresses imposed on the cantilevered structure due to passing vehicles, temperature, and environmental conditions.
Deflection Gauges: These gauges are installed at
various locations including the tip of the cantilever. They track and record the maximum up and
down deflections of the deck as vehicles pass over
Issue 4 • 2020

and cause the deck to deflect. Excessive deflection
can indicate deterioration and loss of stiffness.
Accelerometers: These devices are placed along
the cantilever as well as at the joints and piers.
They record peak amplification due to dynamic
impacts from trucks as well as the natural frequency of vibration of the structure.
City DOT has not followed the Panel’s proposal
for intensive monitoring. Instead the City relies on
quarterly walkthroughs by City DOT engineers, the
biennial in-depth inspection, and regular repairs and
patching of the roadways and joints.
The Expert Panel concluded that these and
similar efforts by the City were insufficient to assure
the safety of the cantilevered bridge. The danger
presented by salt and water is hidden by thick concrete.
This was the condition that led to the collapse of the
Mirandi Bridge in Genoa.
There is no excuse for not using the most modern
monitoring systems. A failure to act on such monitoring
is inexcusable. The public will be unforgiving in the
event of a collapse. In Italy following the collapse of
the Mirandi Bridge, the three top officials responsible
for the Mirandi Bridge have been indicted.
City officials should promptly install the most
modern monitoring equipment to protect the public.
The City and State Must Act Together
The BQE is part of a highway system, and that
system has confusing and conflicting ownerships and
management responsibilities. The State of New York
owns the sections of the BQE immediately north of
Sands Street and south of the City-owned cantilevered
section. The Metropolitan Transportation Authority
controls the tolls and traffic at the Brooklyn Battery
Tunnel. The MTA also controls the fares on the
subways and buses, and the scheduling of transit
service. The Port Authority controls the trans-Hudson
crossings. The federal government, with the State
government, sets standards for highways, approves
designs, and funds new construction. And these
are only the public stakeholders. There are also the
nearby residents and businesses, the truckers and
their associations, and Auto Clubs and other civic and
professional advocates.
The Expert Panel called for an official and formal working coalition of the many stakeholders to
advance a corridor-wide vision that would review the
current and future traffic on the BQE, and the maintenance and reconstruction requirements of the BQE
corridor from Staten Island to Queens.
The formality of a coalition is needed for planning.
But it is needed even more to achieve the coordination and cooperation that will be required to manage
traffic and to advance the demolition and reconstruction of the cantilevered bridge. Without such coordiVolume 26
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nation, there is little hope that the BQE, an essential
urban highway, can continue in the long term to serve
the transportation needs of the New York region.
Time is running out. It is likely that the cantilevered bridge will become unsafe by 2025 or 2026.
Time is not on the City’s side. o

See Also:
Daily News, Sunday, January 24, 2021; Op Ed: New York’s BQE
Emergency.
Wall Street Journal, February 5, 2021; Stalled Highway Project
Could Get Lift From New NYC Transportation Chief.
Daily News, February 10, 2021; Editorial: Yes we can-tilever:
Get to work fixing the BQE, and soon

*The Brooklyn-Queens Expressway Expert Panel: The findings and recommendations are the collaborative work of
the Expert Panel assigned by Mayor Bill de Blasio to study the Brooklyn-Queens Expressway. The Chair and Members
of the BQE Expert Panel were:

Carlo Scissura (Chair), NY Building Congress

Kaan Ozbay, NYU Tandon School of Engineering

Rohit Aggarwala, Sidewalk Labs

Hani Nassif, Rutgers School of Engineering

Vincent Alvarez, New York City Central Labor Council

Benjamin Prosky, AIA New York

Kate Ascher, BuroHappold Engineering

Denise Richardson, General Contractors Association

Steven Cohen, MacAndrew & Forbes Inc.

Ross Sandler, New York Law School

Elizabeth Goldstein, Municipal Arts Society
Henry Gutman, Brooklyn Navy Yard Development Corp.
Kyle Kimball, ConEdison
Mitchell Moss, NYU Wagner Graduate School of

Jay Simon, American Council of Engineering Companies
of New York

Tom Wright, Regional Plan Association
Kathryn Wylde, Partnership for NYC
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NAME, TITLE & AGENCY

DESCRIPTION

PENALTY*

COIB CASE NO.

Settlements
James Sanders, Jr.
Council Member
New York City Council

Accepted valuable gifts including trips on 18
$15,000 fine
occasions from Margert Community Corp. while		
Margert had business dealings with the City.		

2017-110

Kubrat Hristoff
Dir. of Security at Elmhurst Hospital
NYC Health + Hospitals

Used a counterfeit parking placard with the
$2,500 fine
Health + Hospitals Police shield on his personal 		
vehicle to avoid parking tickets.		

2018-108e

Vincent Fraser
Created counterfeit parking placards with the
$4,000 fine
Captain, Health + Hospital Police
Health + Hospitals Police shield and distributed		
at Elmhurst Hospital
the fake placards to Elmhurst Hospital Police.		
NYC Health + Hospitals			

2018-108c

Andrew Hall
Used a counterfeit parking placard with the
$1,300 fine
Special Officer, Health + Hospital Police Health + Hospitals Police shield on his personal 		
at Elmhurst Hospital
vehicle to avoid parking tickets.		
NYC Health + Hospitals			

2018-108h

Melba Yoy
Community Assistant
NYC Taxi & Limousine Commission

Accessed confidential information within TLC
database and sent information to a friend who
had a financial interest in that information.

2019-322

Matthew Ogle
Social Worker/Adjunct Professor
NYC Department of Education/CUNY

Created three fraudulent documents on DOE
$1,500 fine
letterhead to make a CUNY student believe they		
were qualified & selected for a high-ranked job.		

60 calendar day
suspension valued
at $4,838.

2020-299

Letters
Monique Lipscomb
Performed notary public duties outside of her job
No fine
Director of OTPS Budgets & Grants
description while on duty for DOHMH.		
NYC Dept of Health & Mental Hygiene			

2020-088

*Penalty does not necessarily include independent disciplinary action, if any, taken by employee’s agency
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The Center for New York City Law
New York Law School
185 West Broadway
New York NY 10013-2921

upcoming events
The Center's spring programming is under formation.
Despite COVID-19 we hope to host several events
whether in person or through virtual online platforms.

UPCOMING EVENTS
• Spring CityLaw Breakfast series TBA
recent events
CITY LAW BREAKFAST SERIES
On December 3, 2020, James E.
Johnson, Corporation Counsel,
spoke at the 170th CityLaw
Breakfast at New York Law
School. The Breakfast was the
fourth virtual CityLaw Breakfast,
as in-person events are still not
feasible due to the COVID-19
pandemic. Mr. Johnson spoke
about “The Common Good and the Municipal Lawyer:
Managing Risk and Building Trust.” Mr. Johnson began
his talk by reflecting on how the “common good” has
changed over the course of the pandemic and the year
since he took his position as Corporation Counsel. Mr.
Johnson’s approach to risk management highlights
the importance of identifying problems as soon as
possible to prevent them from growing into crises
later; risk management techniques result in reduced
litigation costs, reduced harm, and maintained trust in
government systems. Mr. Johnson discusses how the
COVID-19 pandemic had been a lesson in management
and mismanagement. Collaborative efforts between
the Law Department, City agencies and courts helped
make operations remote as the Law Department
defended COVID-19 restrictions in court and engaged
in transactional work to help secure PPE for health
care workers. Mr. Johnson emphasized the importance
of serving the community as part of achieving the
common good, and encouraged all New Yorkers to find
ways to serve their communities.
Full CityLaw Breakfast video can be watched at www.citylaw.org.
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